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This essay will briefly review the background of the use of the armed 
forces in a police capacity, discuss the growth of that role in the I980s and 
1990s, and forecast an even greater expansion into that role in the near future 
due to the emerging threat of "catastrophic terrorism." It will contend that this 
increased reliance on military resources for policing is not in the interest of 
either the armed forces or the public. Finally, it will make some observations 
with a view towards minimizing the dangers of police-ization of the military 
while ensuring the Nation's public safety. 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 20, 1997 a young American shot a Texas high school 
sophomore to death. Another instance of gang violence? No. In this case the 
shooter was a U.S. Marine on an anti-drug patrol along the Rio Grande, a 
military operation that was part of a large border surveillance project conducted 
under the aegis of Joint Task Force (JTF) 6. 2 The Marine mistook as a threat to 
his life - and that of the Marines with him - the teenager who, though armed 
with a rifle, was merely tending a herd of goats. Although a subsequent 
investigation revealed that the shooting was a tragic culmination of mistakes and 
misperceptions,l the incident served to awaken many Americans to the perils of 
employing the military for domestic security, a function historically the 
province of civilian law enforcement personnel. 
This essay will briefly review the background of the use of the armed 
forces in a police capacity, discuss the growth of that role in the 1980s and 
1990s, and forecast an even greater expansion into that role in the near future 
due to the emerging threat of "catastrophic terrorism." It will contend that this 
increased reliance on military resources for policing is not in the interest of 
either the armed forces or the public. Finally, it will make some observations 
with a view towards minimizing the dangers of police-ization of the military 
while ensuring the Nation's public safety. 
lThe views and opinions he presents are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the 
Department of Defense or any of its components. Copyright ©1999, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. 
2 Joint Task Force 6 is a multi-service organization tasked to provide surveillance for Federal agents 
in border areas. "While not allowed to make arrests, they have carried out hundreds of observation 
sorties along the border, passing on information to the Border Patrol and drug-enforcement agents" 
(Verhovek,1997:12). 
3The Marine responsible for the shooting was never prosecuted (SUfO, 1998:3). 
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BACKGROUND 
Americans have traditionally viewed with suspIcion the use of the 
armed forces for any sort of internal security purpose. These misgivings can be 
traced to the antipathy towards standing armies, which is as old as the nation 
itself (Kohn, 1975:3-9). English colonists, cognizant of the excesses of Oliver 
Cromwell's New Model Army during the English Civil War (Fields and Hardy, 
1992:9-13; Carr, 1990:82), were wary of the nefarious potential of a 
professional military used at home. A further catalyst for this nascent 
antimilitarism arose when Royal troops were employed to suppress the growing 
independence movement in the Colonies (Fields & Hardy, 1992:25-26). 
Resistance to a law enforcement function for military forces hardly 
diminished following the American Revolution. Indeed, in framing the 
Constitution, one of the main aims was to limit the role of military forces in 
domestic activities. The final document provides relatively few authorities for 
employing the military within the Nation's borders. Article I §8, for example, 
allows Congress to provide for "calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of 
the Union and to suppress Insurrections." Additionally, there is the language of 
Article IV §4 which requires the federal government to protect the states against 
invasion and "on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." 
As is suggested above, the Framers intended that the needs of national 
defense would be principally served by reliance not upon full-time regulars, but 
on part-time state-based militias. Even though the militia system seldom 
worked as originally designed, for much of the Nation's history relatively small 
professional forces were augmented in wartime by huge increases in recruitment 
and conscription. Though this ad hoc approach met with mixed success in 
fighting the nation's wars, it essentially remained in place until threat of the 
Soviet Union in the 1950s necessitated the maintenance of an enormous 
. peacetime military establishment during the Cold War. 
Consequently, there have been relatively few occasions where troops 
have functioned in what would be considered today as policemen. A major 
deviation from this norm took place during the Civil War era. Spurred by the 
Confederate insurgency, martial law was implemented in various areas of the 
North (Fairman, 1943: 108-116). When this exercise of military power extended 
to the trial of civilians by military commission, the Supreme Court eventually 
intervened. In the case of Ex Parte Milligan,4 the Court held that conducting 
such trials where the civil courts remained open was beyond the powers of the 
armed forces, despite the existence of a civil war.5 
471 U.S. 2 (1866). 
SFor a discussion of Milligan and other cases addressing civil liberties in wartime, see Rehnquist's 
All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (1998). 
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Nevertheless, in the post-Civil War era federal troops were used 
extensively to police the South for over twenty years. Again, however, the 
wisdom of this strategy was questioned, this time by the legislative branch. 
According to one treatise, "Reconstruction era abuses, culminating in the use of 
federal troops to police polling stations in Southern States (some say to 
influence the outcome of the presidential election of 1876) led to the 1878 Posse 
Comitatus Act" (Dycus, Berney, Banks, and Raven-Hansen, 1990:427). That 
Act6 criminalizes any use of the armed forces to execute the laws except as may 
be specifically authorized by Congress. 
Despite the fact that there has never been a prosecution for a violation 
of the Posse Comitatus Act, 7 for the latter part of the nineteenth and all of the 
twentieth century it served to limit the role of the military in anything 
resembling ordinary police work (except perhaps in the context of constabulary 
duties in frontier areas). Of course, throughout U.S. history military forces have 
been used to enforce civil law against domestic violence, mostly to suppress 
riots and similar civil disorders; in particular, troops were used on several 
occasions to counter labor unrest (Engdahl, 1971). But such uses were 
exceptions to the general rule against the regular use of military force for police-
like duties. 
That paradigm began evolving in the early 1980s with the onset of the 
drug crisis. Cognizant of the international dimensions of the drug trade, 
convinced that local police forces were being overwhelmed by the problem, and 
impressed with the efficiency and renewed popularity of the armed forces, 
Congress passed a number of statutes designed to bring military resources to 
bear on the "war" on drugs. These statutes,S still in effect today, permit the use 
of military equipment and expertise in support of civilian law enforcement 
agencies. However, the law still prohibits a military member from "direct 
participation" in most circumstances in the "search, seizure, arrest, or other 
similar activity.,,9 Separate legislative authority designates the Department of 
618 U.S.c. §1385. 
'During the siege at Wounded Knee, SO, plaintiffs seeking damages following a stand off with a 
group of armed Indians argued that the Army and the Air Force were used in violation of the Posse 
Comitatus Act. The court concluded that although military personnel did furnish advice and 
equipment, this did not constitute "execution" of the laws in violation of the Act. In dicta, 
however, the court did observe that uses of the armed forces contrary to the Act could result in a 
finding that evidence thereby obtained was in admissible. Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, affd, 
800 F. 2d 812 (81h Cir, 1986) (en bane), affd, 485 U.S. 264 (1988). Thus, litigation involving the 
Act occasionally appears but in the context of using it as an exclusionary rule, not as the basis for a 
criminal prosecution itself. 
'See Chapter 18 of Title 10, U.S. Code. 
"10 U.S.c. §375. 
r 
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Defense (DoD) as the lead agency for the "detection and monitoring of aerial 
and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.,,10 
It is important to observe that these strictures do not necessarily limit 
the authority of state forces - to include the National Guard - unless and 
untilthey are federalized. II This important legal distinction is often lost on the 
public. Given that the Guard's uniforms and equipment is virtually identical to 
that of the regular armed forces, this perception is wholly understandable. Still, 
the ever more frequent use of Guard personnel for drug operations and other law 
enforcement functions serves to acclimate the public to the notion of uniformed 
military personnel performing such duties. 
In any event, the end result of almost two decades of statutory change 
and billions of dollars in budgetary expenditures is the entrenchment of both 
regular and part-time military personnel in a variety of counterdrug efforts, 12 
including JTF 6. In addition, there have been calls to use troops to augment 
police forces in high-crime, drug-infested urban areas (e.g., O'Neill, 1994:11). 
Clearly, more than anything else the drug problem has pushed the armed forces 
into institutionalized participation in law enforcement matters. 
Counterdrug activities and the new statutes supporting them have also 
stimulated much collaboration between police and military forces. This has 
contributed to the 'militarization' of police forces as they incorporate a wide-
range of military equipment into their inventories (e.g., Police Get Gadgetry ... , 
1998:C4), and tum to the military for advice and training (e.g., Loder, 1994:35). 
In important ways we are witnessing a problematic convergence of police and 
military interests. 
THE FUTURE 
The involvement of the armed forces in what might be considered 
police or law enforcement activities is poised to increase exponentially in the 
near future. This is largely because of the growing threat of terrorism. While 
terrorism has a long history, consciousness of its dangers in the U.S. has risen 
markedly in the past few years. Bombings at New York's World Trade Center 
and Oklahoma City's Murrah Federal Building underlined terrorism's potential. 
Still, as destructive as those events were, they were efficiently investigated and 
the perpetrators quickly apprehended by law enforcement agencies with little 
help from the military. 
But even greater focus on terrorism was generated by the 1995 attack 
in Tokyo. In that event a religious cult released the deadly gas sarin in a subway 
leaving 12 people dead and over 2,500 injured. Such incidents have spawned 
WIO U.S.C. §124. 
liThe National Guard is a hybrid organization having both state and federal status (Rich, 1994:35). 
'2Jim Garamone, DoD Actively Supports Counterdrug Efforts, American Forces Information 
Service, Nov. 1998, found at www.defenselink.mil/newslNovI998/nl1301998_9811303.html 
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fear of what is termed "catastrophic terrorism" (e.g., Lewis, 1998:9). This 
insidious peril is usefully divided into two forms for purposes of this analysis: 1) 
that involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons; and 2) that involving threats to microchip-based 
information and computer systems so critical to modem societies. 
With the new awareness have come new calls to use the armed forces 
to confront this unprecedented security challenge. 13 In a sense, the use of the 
military to confront these perils parallels the rationale for its use in the more 
traditional domestic role of the suppression of civil disorders and even its newer 
role in drug interdiction. Specifically, the threats have the potential to 
overwhelm police resources because of the emerging capability of a relatively 
small numbers of non-state actors to use WMD to inflict casualties on a wartime 
scale (e.g., Bayles, 1998:1). 
There have been a variety of DoD responses to the threat of 
catastrophic terrorism. Today, for example, the armed forces operate the 
Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) in the Pentagon. This organization 
serves as nerve center for military involvement in all kinds of domestic activities 
ranging from the "presidential inaugurations and Olympic Games to terrorist 
bombings and urban riots" (Blazar, 1998: 12). 
In addition, the Pentagon is responsible for the Domestic Preparedness 
Program, an ambitious effort to train local police, fire, and medical personnel to 
deal with the dangers posed by biological and chemical devices. 14 
Complementing this effort was the formation of several special military units to 
counter the WMD threat both at home and abroad (Graham, 1997: 1). In 
addition, the National Guard is organizing 170 reconnaissance and 
decontamination teams to respond to domestic WMD attacks (Ruppe, 1998: 1). 
A related but somewhat different dilemma is presented by the threat to 
the nation's computer and communications systems. Many experts had long 
argued that the U.S. was extremely vulnerable to what has been called 
"cyberterrorism" or "information warfare" (Schwartau, 1996). Recently, the 
President, following the recommendations of his Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Commission, sought $1.4 billion for his Fiscal Year 2000 budget to 
develop systems to protect the Nation's banking, electric, transportation, and 
other critical industries (Harreld, 1999: 1). 
IlFor example, Section 324(4) of Public Law 104-132 (cited at 22 V.S.C. §2377 note) states that 
Congress find that "the President should use all necessary means, including covert action and 
military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure used by international 
terrorists. including overseas training facilities and safe havens" (emphasis added). 
"See 10 V.S.C §382. The effort reportedly has met with mixed success (Bayles, 1998:1). 
I 
I 
I' 
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For the U.S. military cyberterrorism is an especially serious problem as 
it is heavily dependent upon computers for its daily operations, and it relies 
upon many of the same micro-based communication and electronic systems 
used by the general public (Office of Under Secretary ... , 1996). Thus, wholly 
apart from any abstract desire to aid civilian law enforcement agencies, the 
armed forces have a very great interest in analyzing and defeating this kind of 
threat. And that threat is real: during an exercise in June 1997 it was discovered 
that DoD computer systems were far more vulnerable than had been previously 
thought. 
As a consequence, the Pentagon recently announced the formation of a 
Joint Task Force Network Defense. This organization currently has the limited 
mission of defending DoD computers (Wolfe, 1999: 1). However, newly-issued 
Pentagon doctrine suggests that protection of the Nation's information 
infrastructure is properly a responsibility of DoD (Chairman, 1998). 
The enormous scope of the threat of catastrophic terrorism has also 
generated suggestions for new organizations within the armed forces. Most 
recently, a plan has been proposed to establish a single military commander with 
authority to oversee domestic defense in the event of terrorist attack. According 
to press reports, this "homeland defense" commander "would have the know-
how and authority to quickly dispatch technicians and troops who could help 
deal with terrorist attacks that officials fear could inflict thousands of casualties 
and disrupt whole cities" (Richter, 1999:3). 
THE EMERGING ISSUES 
What we have seen in the last twenty years is an increasing police-
ization of the military, that is, a growing tendency to look to the armed forces to 
perform tasks that are, essentially, law enforcement in nature. To many 
Americans the use of the military for these purposes is of little concern to them. 
The armed forces consistently lead public opinion polls as the most trusted 
institution in American society, toping even organized religion and the Supreme 
Court. Moreover, as John Hillen, then an analyst for the Heritage Foundation, 
put it in 1996: "Why do politicians want to use the military for police duties? To 
take advantage of one of the few parts of the federal government that actually 
works" (Hillen, 1996:2). 
Notwithstanding the seeming acquiescence of the public, this growing 
trend bears further analysis. In truth, there are very few models in modem times 
where the military effectively conducted a police-like internal security mission 
consistent with both the maintenance of an authentic combat capability and 
democratic values. That said, the issues with regard to police-ization of the 
armed forces can usefully be divided into practical problems and philosophical 
ones. 
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THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 
One of the principal reasons that many military leaders have long 
resisted employing their troops as police forces relates to the very practical 
concern that doing so diminishes combat prowess. Despite what the casual 
observer may think, there are surprisingly few synergies between law 
enforcement and military missions. 
Examining the border shooting incident provides an illustration. There 
the Marine Corps insisted that the patrol acted in accordance with the "JTF-6 
rules of engagement of which include the inherent right of self-defense" 
(Martin, 1998: I). Though resolution of the specific facts of that case is beyond 
the scope of this article, it is easy to see how a dichotomy might arise. Military 
forces operating in a domestic situation where the rules of engagement limit the 
use of force to "self-defense" situations might still have an interpretation of the 
scope of the term that differs from that of local police forces. Under military 
practice force may be used in self-defense to "decisively counter the hostile act 
or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of U.S. forces." Moreover, 
under certain conditions, engagement is permitted "until hostile force no longer 
presents an imminent threat" (Chairman, 1994:EncA). 
However, state law, not military doctrine, governs when military forces 
are acting domestically against civilian suspects outside of a federal enclave. 
Accordingly, the legal authority to use deadly force in such situations may only 
be that available to any citizen (as opposed to law enforcement officer) in a 
particular jurisdiction (Torcia, 1979:§125). Thus, state legal requirements that 
mandate actions such as "retreat to the wall" before the use of deadly force is 
permitted lS are unknown in military practice and unlikely to be well understood 
by troops in the field. 
Indeed, using military forces for tasks that are essentially law 
enforcement in nature requires a fundamental change in orientation. To put it 
bluntly, in its most basic iteration military training is aimed at killing people and 
breaking things. Consequently, military doctrine has forces moving on a target 
by fire and maneuver with a view towards destroying that target. Police forces, 
on the other hand, take a very different approach. They have to exercise the 
studied restraint that a judicial process requires. They gather evidence and 
arrest suspects. Where the military sees enemies of the United States, a police 
agency - properly oriented - sees citizens suspected of crimes but innocent until 
proven guilty in a court of law. These are two different views of the world. 
Thus, it is difficult for military personnel trained under a regime that 
emphasizes combat skills to easily align themselves with the more restrained 
procedure required for police work in a democratic society. When forced into 
such situations, military personnel tend to revert to the combat-oriented 
architecture that they understand and in which they are comfortable operating. 
15See id., § 126. 
. ... ~ 
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Thus, it is not surprising that, for example, Marine officers would characterize 
their deployment during the 1992 Los Angeles riots in the military coda of 
"Domestic Peacekeeping". More troubling, but still comprehensible given their 
background and training, are reports that some Marines "when faced with 
violating doctrine or violating federal law ... chose the latter course" (Ricks, 
1996:21-22). 
It is, of course, possible to train military personnel to suppress their 
previously instilled combat instincts to perform in the more restricted law 
enforcement environment. However, once military personnel are converted into 
effective policemen, the very ethos that makes them succeed in combat has been 
dangerously eroded. The restraint so necessary for law enforcement could be 
catastrophic in war. Years before the 1997 JTF-6 incident, a colonel observing 
Marines firing warning shots during a border skirmish with smugglers later 
argued that "combat-trained Marines shouldn't be diminishing hard-learned 
skills by squeezing off warning shots" (Torque and Waller, 1990: 18). 
Even when training succeeds in sufficiently purging military personnel 
of their combat skills so that they conduct themselves appropriately as law 
enforcement agents, a significant and costly commitment must be made to 
retrain them back into warfighting mindset once those duties are completed. In 
an era of fewer and fewer troops and more and more commitments commanders 
are understandably reluctant to do anything that saps combat readiness. 
Another factor contributing to the reluctance of military commanders 
to become involved in law enforcement activities is the potential damage to 
morale and discipline that may result. It is mistaken to assume that an 
individual who joins an all-volunteer force such as the U.S. military is 
necessarily inclined to perform domestic police duties. Quite obviously, if that 
were his or her personal inclination they would have joined a police force. 
Moreover, while military personnel may be mentally well equipped to deal with 
a vicious battlefield adversary, they are rather less prepared to deal with a 
sophisticated criminal aiming to corrupt them. 16 Military leaders simply do not 
wish to expose their troops to this kind of influence. 
Additionally, military officers also believe that using military personnel 
for domestic law enforcement purposes carries great potential to harm civil-
military relations. It can bring the military in conflict with civilian society and 
aggravate what many see as a growing estrangement of the military from the 
society it serves (Ricks, 1996:21-22). The uproar following the shooting in 
Texas is just one example. This may be one reason why the Secretary of 
Defense radically narrowed the circumstances under which such armed patrols 
might take place (Ground Troop ... , 1999:1). 
16Indeed, some criminals have succeeded in corrupting military personnel (e.g., Reza, 1998: I). 
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But it is the emergence of "catastrophic terrorism" that portends the 
circumstance with the greatest potential to draw military personnel into 
domestic security situations. On one hand, the immensity of threat necessitates 
military involvement, especially when WMD is involved, as only the armed 
forces have the infrastructure and training to meet the challenge of mass 
casualties. Other, technical aspects of catastrophic terrorism, will likely pull 
military personnel into law enforcement duties more directly, although 
inadvertently. 
Consider the menace of "cyberattack." It presents a particular 
conundrum for military officials because of the technical difficulty of 
distinguishing between assaults carried out by clever teenagers on a lark and 
those conducted by cyberterrorists and enemy nation-states bent on inflicting 
grievous damage to U.S. national security. Given that at the time of a particular 
assault on a DoD computer system it may be impossible to know the identity of 
the attacker, military personnel could find themselves aggressively responding 
against a fellow citizen in a manner appropriate to a hostile foreign force, but 
inconsistent with what an American rightly expects when merely suspected of a 
crime. 
Conceiving of terrorists as criminals entitled to due process is not 
intuitive to military personnel or, for that matter, the terrorists themselves. 
Many terrorists and terrorist organizations like to portray themselves as 
"soldiers" engaged in "wars" against the U.S. and other mainly Western nations. 
However, both historical and current practice in the U.S. usually characterizes 
them as common criminals. 17 There are several reasons for this approach, not 
the least of which is the fact that under international law, lawful combatants in 
armed conflict are privileged from prosecution for violent acts that are otherwise 
in compliance with the law of war. In addition, combatants are entitled to POW 
status if captured. 
Terrorists do not ordinarily achieve status as lawful combatants in 
armed conflict because the international law of war principally governs conflicts 
between nation-states and certain internationally recognized entities.18 Though 
the law of war does apply to certain groups of irregular belligerents, terrorists 
also ordinarily fail to meet the minimum legal standards applicable to such 
forces in that they fail to carry arms openly, wear a distinctive uniform or 
symbol, and subject themselves to internal military discipline aimed at enforcing 
the law of war. 
17 At least one authority contends that some terrorists may also be considered as unlawful 
combatants in an armed conflict (e.g., Erickson, 1989). 
"This analysis is sourced in both conventional (treaty) law and customary international law (Air 
Force Pamphlet, 1976:110-31). 
'. 
11 
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In short, though they now may have the capability to inflict cataclysmic 
damage on the U.S., the magnitude of their crimes does not, per se, transform 
terrorists into something other than criminals. Thus, perhaps the most 
formidable threat to U.S. interests in the future is, by its very nature, 
fundamentally a criminal challenge, albeit of unprecedented dimensions. This 
presents significant philosophical issues. 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 
To be sure, philosophical reservations about the involvement of 
military personnel in law enforcement activities did not arise solely with the 
emergence of the challenge of catastrophic terrorism. Much concern has been 
expressed over the years about the military's drug control activities, and this 
uneasiness continues. Former secretary of the Navy John Lehman wrote 
recently of the military's role in drug interdiction that "by accepting that new 
(and I believe unconstitutional) mission, the services have become de facto 
police. To involve the services in domestic law enforcement is to cross a 
dangerous line in separation of powers" (Lehman, 1998:24; parenthetical in 
original). 
In this connection it is worth remembering that the genius of the 
traditional American law enforcement system is that most police power is 
diffused among thousands of communities. Most of these more or less 
independent police agencies are subject to strict control by elected leaders at the 
local or state level. The civilian control of the military, however, is centralized 
in the President and national command authorities in Washington (Wisotsky, 
1993: 17,19). This system works well when confronting a foreign threat, 
markedly less well when employed domestically to interact with the citizenry 
where force of arms is seldom the appropriate or necessary law enforcement 
tactic. 
The troublesome potential of the enhanced role of the military in 
counter~terrorism is generating the most criticism. Former Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger condemned the proposals by saying that they were 
"repugnant to democratic society" (as quoted by Kellman, 1995:6). Though 
there are no current plans to expand military authority into direct law 
enforcement (e.g., arrest/search authority), it is difficult to see how that could be 
avoided in a situation that would likely border on mass chaos. 
The previously discussed proposal to appoint a single military 
commander for a "homeland defense" organization to handle such situations 
causes one critic to warn about the risk of "mission creep." Gregory T. Nojem, 
legislative counsel on national security for the American Civil Liberties Union, 
says, "The danger is in the inevitable expansion of that authority so the military 
gets involved in things like arresting people and investigating crimes .... It's 
hard to believe that a soldier with a suspect in the sights of his M-I tank is well 
positioned to protect that person's civil liberties" (as quoted by Broad and 
Miller, 1999: 1). 
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Obviously, those concerned with both civil liberties and domestic 
security are rightly apprehensive about the outcome of the current debates. One 
important step in setting the right course for the future would be establishing a 
clear definition of the kinds of threats manifesting a true national security threat, 
and those which present a law enforcement problem recognizing, of course, that 
overlap can occur from time to time. 
In considering this issue, it may be helpful to recall recent experience. 
As discussed above, during the 1980s and 1990s there was a major effort to 
transform the national drug issue into a national security threat suitable for the 
application of military force. Though military intrusion in what was essentially 
a law enforcement problem did grow, it fell short of full police-ization of the 
armed forces. 
Today, we face another peril, that of catastrophic terrorism. The nature 
of this threat, if characterized as a national security risk, carries great potential 
to force that next step. No one should suffer the illusion that military forces 
could ever execute the laws with the same sensitivity to civil liberties as regular 
police forces. To do so is at odds with the central imperatives of military 
service. Moreover, a successful policization of the armed forces may well 
render it incapable of defeating authentic external military threats. 
What does the future hold? Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
warned in 1997 that "terrorism is escalating to the point that citizens of the 
United States may soon have to choose between civil liberties and more 
intrusive forms of protection" (as quoted in Pexton, 1997:3). That may be so, 
but employing military forces for internal security purposes will surely 
exacerbate it. Confronting terrorism requires, among other things, an intensive 
intelligence effort and aggressive investigative work. A military organization 
adept at destroying targets and undermining enemy command and control 
structures is not necessarily the best organization to do such work in a 
democracy. 
It must be pointed out that in the American experience any effort at 
police-ization of the armed forces almost always arises from outside the military 
establishment. In the case of catastrophic terrorism, the lack of any immediate 
alternative complicates short-term solutions. In reporting the proposed 
terrorism-adapted "homeland defense" force, the Washington Post captured the 
essence of the dilemma: 
"Frankly, we are not seeking this job," said 
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre. 
He acknowledged that "most Americans" 
are "apprehensive" about the military 
getting involved in domestic policing and 
CrISIS management. "But we know we're 
being asked to be involved because we have 
I 
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the only part of government that has the 
resources that can be mobilized, " he added 
(Graham, 1999:2). 
A recent article in Foreign Affairs proposed a program for combating 
catastrophic terrorism that will require some of the intrusiveness about which 
Secretary Cohen warns and Deputy Secretary Hamre recognizes (Carter, 
Deutch, and Zelikow, 1998:80). Still - except for certain aspects of the draft 
National Terrorism Intelligence Center - it carefully excludes DoD from most 
activities in the law enforcement realm. (DoD would, however, have a large 
role in consequence management and preemptive and retaliatory strikes.) 
Similarly, a Justice Department proposal to take the lead from DoD in counter-
terrorism preparedness by 2001 appears to be the direction the evolution should 
take (Justice Department Poised ... , 1998: 14). 
Such proposals have real potential. However, considerable work is 
required for implementation. As these and other ideas are considered, it is vital 
that inertia and the penchant for quick-fixes not allow responsibility for 
countering catastrophic terrorism to permanently devolve to the armed forces. 
The risks of doing so are very great, and we should not be seduced by absence 
in modern times of significant abuses by the armed forces. The stakes are very 
high. As Colonel Harry G. Summers, a decorated Army veteran and expert on 
national security affairs, warns: 
Like using fascism as a cure for the Great 
Depression, the involvement of military 
forces in civilian law enforcement could 
prove to be a greater assault on our 
democracy than any terrorist bombing, for it 
could destroy that democracy's very 
foundations (Summers, 1995: 17). 
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